innovate. The paper shows that, beyond the application of FRAND in the competition law context, the European Union institutions have consistently used the FRAND regime to ensure access to critical infrastructure or inputs. The FRAND regime has been applied in EU legislation such as standardisation, chemicals, electronic communications framework, public sector information, research framework, vehicles emissions, payment services, credit rating agencies and benchmark regulations. It has proved itself to be a flexible and pragmatic tool, able to apply to different market dynamics and bottlenecks. Drawing out the common elements of this European FRAND access regime, the paper considers how it could be applied as a regulatory solution for dominant digital platforms.
Abstract:
Dominant digital platforms are under increased scrutiny by regulators around the world, notably competition authorities. Much of the discussion focuses on market access and contestability. However, many doubt whether traditional competition law enforcement can, by itself, be an adequate solution to the challenges posed by dominant digital platforms. Instead, a broader regulatory solution could be devised to ensure effective competition and to provide access to critical platforms or access to data. On the premises that regulation is warranted, this paper considers whether a Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) access regime could be a solution to ensure effective competition, while maintaining the incentives of dominant platforms to 
For example, in its Proposal for an online intermediation services
Regulation the European Commission acknowledges a lacuna in addressing "unilateral potentially harmful trading practices" by digital platforms that are not necessarily competition law infringements and which European competition law may therefore not address.
4
As Cremer put it, "Given their societal importance, there will be strong regulations of platforms". See Jacques that, on that assumption, the FRAND access regime has shown itself to be a flexible tool for managing platforms and could be applied as a safe harbour or a regulatory solution to dominant digital platforms.
7 The paper is structured as follows. We first review competition law issues surrounding the conduct of dominant digital platforms. Second, we look at the applicability of FRAND access principles in relevant competition cases. We then review the FRAND access concept applied in some key EU legislation governing standardisation; chemicals; electronic communications framework; public sector information; research framework; vehicles emissions, payment services; credit rating agencies and benchmark regulations. This is not a forensic review of European FRAND-based legislation but seeks instead to capture the principal examples thereof. Finally, we summarise some of the essential elements of the European FRAND regime before concluding.
C. Issues surrounding the application of competition law in regulating the conduct of dominant digital platforms 8 How to assess the effects of dominant digital platforms on competition and what, if anything, should be done is subject to an ongoing debate in the literature and policy circles. 5 The fundamental issue is that dominant digital platforms effectively create an ecosystem lock-in. This may be either because competition is often "for" the market not "on" the market, or because the platform functions as de facto gatekeeper to an ecosystem, pulling in service or content suppliers, intermediaries, customers or consumers.
6
Cremer presentation at ICLE/University of Leeds Annual Competition Law Conference 25 October 2018, Washington DC.
5
For example, the US Federal Trade Commission is currently looking at "the identification and measurement of market power and entry barriers, and the evaluation of collusive, exclusionary, or predatory conduct or conduct that violates the consumer protection statutes enforced by the FTC, in markets featuring "platform" businesses." See <https:// www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2018/06/ftcannounces-hearings-competition-consumer-protection21st>. See also the inquiry by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission into the market power of digital platforms e.g. <https://www.accc.gov.au/focus-areas/ inquiries/digital-platforms-inquiry>. See also Khan, Lina, Amazon's Antitrust Paradox (January 31, 2017) . Yale Law Journal, Vol. 126, 2017. 6 See US Senator Mark Werner's observation regard: "certain technologies serve as critical, enabling inputs to wider technology ecosystems, such that control over them can be leveraged by a dominant provider to extract unfair terms 1 9 Where the platform's role is central to the ecosystem and certain players are locked-in, the market position of a platform may be practically impossible to challenge. Nevertheless the question remains whether new players or new ecosystems can create effective competitive constraints on the platform or whether some competitive pressure needs to be maintained through regulation, in order to ensure that actors within the ecosystem have access to critical elements of the platform, especially to enable continued competition in secondary or associated markets.
10 Regulators around the world face a challenge to create a satisfactory framework to ensure fair access of consumers and users to digital platforms supporting an environment for innovation and competition in dynamic markets. After many years of exploration, including some enforcement decisions, there is no consensus on some critical issues, ranging from simple taxonomy, to the more complex issue of market definition; tipping points that connote-market power; the extent dominant platforms can distort competition; the welfare costs of intervention; or the difficulty of designing effective ex post remedies. 7 Enforcers continue to face difficulties in fitting classic competition analysis to this paradigm, yet as noted by Coyle "… without a greater degree of consensus about how to analyze competition in digital platform markets, including methodologies for empirical assessment, it will be impossible for the relevant authorities or courts to do anything other than feel their way along on a case by case basis". 8 11 Is the existing competition assessment toolkit sufficient to catch abusive "dominant" digital platforms or does it need to be expanded? Tirole notes "With rapidly changing technologies and globalization, traditional regulatory tools have become less effective, causing competition policy to lag" and "Policymakers and regulators around the world must face the fact that the reasoning behind traditional competition measures is no longer valid". Coyle suggests that rather than focusing on prices and consumer switching behaviour or traditional market definition, antitrust authorities should favour a wider assessment of the platform's market ecosystem, focusing "on the scope for disruptive technological innovation and the dynamic consumer benefits of investment". 10 Yet others question calls for a broadening of the consumer welfare standard. As Melamed & Petit note: "Unless critics intend to make antitrust law a general tool for attacking all sorts of inequalities in size, power and wealth unrelated to market competition, they will not be able to improve antitrust law by abandoning the [consumer welfare] standard in platform markets in particular and across industries in general."
11 To borrow a phrase from Fox, this debate is nothing less than a battle for the soul of competition law.
12
12 Another aspect is whether the competition law system is able to play a part in addressing societal concerns created by supra-dominant platforms which, through their sheer size, have such a seismic impact on whole economies and even democracies.
Should the "bigness" of the handful of "mega" platforms even be a concern of competition law? Should the standard of consumer welfare be expanded beyond the "classic" consumer to capture, for example, the individual as a data subject, as an employee or even a voter? Should data (or subset thereof) be considered an essential input, or should some dominant platforms be considered an essential facility?
13 If current competition law approaches contain inadequacies in addressing problems associated with dominant digital platforms, some suggest that legislation could be used to define new thresholds (e.g. user base, size, lock in) above which "certain core functions/platforms/apps would constitute 'essential facilities', requiring a platform to provide third party access on fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms and preventing platforms from engaging in self-dealing or preferential conduct". 13 In addition, legislation or regulation could ensure access to critical technology by requiring that dominant platforms maintain 1 Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) for third party access, thus achieving interoperability, under FRAND terms. However, even some who argue that the consumer welfare standard should be broaden acknowledge that competition law should not be used to make every successful platform a utility. 14 14 It should be unnecessary to consider the "essential facilities" doctrines broadly. In elaborating coherent rules for emerging platforms that may reach a tipping point (and be conferred with the special responsibility that comes with market power), ex ante "remedies" can be devised to ensure that lock in does not occur. The issue only really arises when considering what should be done with existing "mega-platforms" and whether, after recognising a problem, a remedy can be fashioned that addresses various tensions of proportionality, effectiveness, as well as practicality, that are rooted in commercial reality.
15 This paper therefore explores existing practices relating to FRAND access in European law and policy as a possible practical framework to address situations where digital platforms are either found to be dominant or where platforms may wish, ex ante, to adopt a reasonable and pragmatic solution, in order to avoid allegations of market power or its abuse -and therefore forestall regulatory scrutiny.
16
The next sections will describe and analyse the applicability of FRAND access framework in EU competition law and legislation.
D. FRAND in the Context of Competition Law & Policy

I. Competition Policy and FRAND
17 The concept of "fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory" access is increasingly used by competition authorities as a "good faith" notion, applied as a competition law remedy to ensure the supply of a particular product or the access to specific infrastructure. 15 In particular, FRAND access the decoders and software used by the combined entity's platform's customers. 24 In Siemens/ Drägerwerk, royalty free FRAND commitments were given to ensure continued interoperability between medical equipment platforms and hospital data management systems, including making available and maintaining all existing and future interfaces and communications protocols. 25 In Worldline/Equens the merging parties agreed to license on FRAND terms to payment network service providers (NSPs) within Germany key card and payment processing software, as well as the source code for the Poseidon software and the ZVT protocol, on which most German point of sale terminals run.
26
21 It is worth noting that in Worldline/Equens, additional "flanking" commitments were offered to ensure that the FRAND remedy was effective. These include effectively capping software maintenance fees for 10 years; ensuring additional costs (e.g. maintenance services were also under FRAND terms); that NSPs' access would be prioritised over Worldline's PaySquare in case of shortage; including new modules and upgrades at no additional cost; that NSPs would have access to Poseidon source code for internal business use, in return for a oneoff price-regulated fee; to place governance of the ZVT protocol with an external, independent notfor-profit, entity that would represent all market participants; that the Licensing Trustee would have access to all of Worldline licenses, contracts, pricing and invoicing conditions enabling it to effectively review the commitments, and that NSPs could seek more favourable terms if the Licensing Trustee considered PaySquare had advantageous terms; and set up a fast-track dispute resolution mechanism. Finally, as a compliance tool, a material breach of the remedies would result in NSPs having access to the source code free of charge.
27
22 The Newscorp/Telepiù remedy is also worth further comment. During the Commission's investigation, third parties expressed concerns that the applicable European regulatory framework, which required those operators to offer access of digital television services on a FRAND basis to all broadcasters, 28 might not be sufficient to constrain likely foreclosure by Newscorp in the Italian pay-TV market. 29 The 24 29 Newscorp/Telepiu, para 121 identifying specific concerns 1
European Commission found that cooperation with and by Newcorp or its subsidiary, NDS, was critical to enter the Italian pay-TV market. Most interestingly, the European Commission found 30 that given the technical difficulties for pay-TV operators both using a different CAS to NDS or implementing Simulcrypt obligations within a short period of time, it created a complete dependence on the combined entity from the technological viewpoint.
31
Newscorp's control of the technical platform would give it the possibility and the incentive to set the standard for the accepted level of "intra-platform" competition. The European Commission therefore imposed measures to effectively compel Newscorp to comply with the existing FRAND rules found within the legislative framework. In that context, while a monitoring trustee was appointed to ensure compliance with the remedies, disputes related to the licensing terms fall to be adjudicated to the Italian Communications Authority, the national regulatory authority responsible for safeguarding the implementation of the regulatory framework. Newscorp/Telepiù therefore agreed to allow access to the API so far as necessary to develop interactive services compatible with the decoders used by the Combined Platform's customers.
32
23 In sum, the FRAND regime has now been applied by competition authorities in Europe (and indeed further afield) to ensure access to products and services across a range of sectors. FRAND access commitments have proved particularly useful and are the least intrusive remedies, where there is no adequate regulatory framework in place that addresses underlying competitive concerns.
33
24 Competition law can therefore continue to ensure intra-and inter-platform competition by promoting access to critical inputs using a tried-andtested regime that ensures a balance of interests, regarding technical services for pay-TV, and in particular conditional access systems being the likelihood that the new entity grant access to the NDS technology for CAS to potential new entrants under unfair terms and conditions; and that the new entity obstruct the entry of alternative pay-TV platforms with a different CAS system from that of NDS, leading to a virtual monopoly, in view of the fact that NDS would become the only CAS used in Italy.
30 Newscorp/Telepiu, para 140.
31 "A number of respondents in the market investigation have gone as far as considering NDS technology as a sort of 'essential facility' for the Italian pay-TV market". See Newscorp/Telepiu, para 124.
32 Newscorp/Telepiù Commitments, Part II, para 11.5.
33 FRAND remedies also address regulatory efficiency concerns as they are also self-policing, as a FRAND regime grants a clear cause of action before the courts to third parties harmed by exclusion or non-FRAND terms, as well as possible ex post regulatory actions under Article 102 (and what that would imply for remedies for findings of exclusion).
guaranteeing equality of arms in negotiations, minimising impact of regulatory intervention, and basing remedies on existing sector practices. Indeed, in setting out some lessons to be drawn from European competition cases involving platforms, Petit observes that while EU technology policy is premised on ex ante regulation, antitrust enforcement appears to effectively act as a "fact finding exercise or as a regulatory kick starter seconded by regulatory propositions, notably as relates to online platform regulation." 34 25 Competition law policy is an important complement to broader European policy measures, but competition policy should not be primarily driven through cases: such an approach has significant flaws. First, imposing FRAND access as a merger remedy is opportunistic and dependent upon having a notifiable merger to begin with. If there is no relevant merger review where a FRAND access regime can be considered, alternative instruments should be considered to provide guidance to undertakings. In any event, FRAND access remedies would be merger-specific and could not necessarily be applied as a universal solution to dominant digital platforms across similar markets. The same can be said for other competition enforcement measures. Second, in non-merger cases, substantive competition law investigations are inherently slow. They typically last for several years during which market developments may often render any remedy too late to address pressing competitive concerns. In addition, enforcement cases are also fact-specific and companies under investigation should be confident that their case will not be "hijacked" for policy-making purposes. Finally, if cases end up in commitment decisions, any FRAND access remedy may provide little precedential value for other companies. Consequently, competition law remedies should be complemented by broader policy measures. There is therefore something to be said for a more structured competition approach to FRAND, especially given the jurisprudence already developed by the European Commission.
26 Competition law and national competition authorities may have a role to play in providing more structural guidance to companies. As Tirole notes, "rapidly changing technologies and globalization, traditional regulatory tools have become less effective, causing competition policy to lag", which requires more agile policies to be developed including "soft law" instruments. 38 the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) considered whether a SEP owner found to be dominant had abused that dominant position where it sought an injunction for the infringement of its SEP, to which a FRAND commitment had been made. The Court held, amongst other things, that a competition law defence could be raised by an infringer of an SEP against a request for an injunction, where a dominant SEP holder had not followed certain steps, including making a FRAND offer.
39 Following those steps creates a safe harbour for the SEP holder when requesting an injunction. However, the Court also set out certain steps that the infringer has to follow if they were to be able to avail themselves of such a defence. As a result, the Court set out a negotiating process that, where followed, should lead to a FRAND outcome. What Huawei v ZTE shows is that, in the event of a dispute, where both parties follow the steps required of them, access on a FRAND-basis is ensured and third parties are not unduly excluded on the basis of proprietary rights. It also shows, at a high level, that the Court built its decision around the FRAND commitment. in creating the access regime; (ii) a framework of contractual negotiations favouring "a pro-market solution over direct government intervention"; 55 (iii) a concrete base for calculating compensation, relying on the cost for undertaking the relevant study; (iv) a mechanism for dispute resolution "that enables the public interest to prevail and that provides sufficient legal certainty for the parties when they assess whether it makes sense to depart from that rule".
56 One particularly interesting aspect in looking to REACH as inspiration for FRAND-based access regimes is that the public interest is broader than ones that traditionally have resulted in compulsory licensing regimes.
41 Further, as Drexl notes, the REACH framework relies on bilateral commercial negotiations to determine the conditions for a pro-competitive solution.
57
While the REACH legislation does not engage in price-setting, which is so difficult for a legislature to get right, REACH does provide cost "metrics" in the event that no agreement can be arrived at; costs are limited to sharing the proportionate costs of information necessary to satisfy registration requirements. 58 Therefore legislation can provide guideposts to the parties in the event of a dispute, but the legislation need not get engaged in creating value homogeneity. These metrics are, however, specific to the scope of REACH related to the sharing of scientific studies and data and so are generally not applicable to other sectors.
III. European Electronic Communications Code
42
The recently adopted European Electronic Communications Code (EECC) provides updated EU-wide telecommunication rules. 59 It contains a number of provisions providing for access to and interconnection of electronic communication networks on terms that are fair, reasonable and non-55 Ibid. Drexl (2017), at para 180, also considers that a REACHlike access regime could also be implemented in situation where there is no additional public interest, arguing that this "would make sense if it is devised as a non-mandatory procedural framework for negotiations on access to information" and considers that the negotiation framework devised by the European Court in Huawei v ZTE "could especially be applicable for cases in which the holder of information publicly commits to grant access to data on FRAND terms". 70 The reasons for regulating operators with SMP is to ensure ex ante competition is maintained, when traditional ex post competition law remedies may not be sufficient nor adequate to safeguard effective competition in the telecommunications market.
46
The EECC therefore contains FRAND-based access regimes to networks, infrastructure and content. It is primarily managed by NRAs, who are best placed to assess the situation on the ground, given the nature of the markets. These access regimes are imposed in order to satisfy various public policy objectives, including ensuring full end-user connectivity, resolve infrastructure bottlenecks or safeguard ex ante competition, as an adjunct to ad hoc competition enforcement. The EECC thus shows that European legislation does not shy away from mandating access to critical infrastructure in order to satisfy broader policy objectives.
47 Interestingly, the EECC also includes an obligation to provide interoperability between "interpersonal communication services", which reach a significant level of coverage and user uptake. 71 This provision may arguably be used by NRAs to impose an obligation on widely used communication applications or social platforms to interoperate.
72 However, such regulatory interventions may be possible only where end-to-end connectivity is endangered and only to the extent necessary to ensure connectivity between end-users.
73 Nevertheless, this provision represents an evolution in providing a regulatory solution to ensuring interoperability between particular types of platforms that have a significant reach, though it may not be dominant in the competition law sense. The FRAND-based remedy is available to satisfy the broad public interest objectives found in the EECC, that include ensuring freedom of expression and information, as well as media pluralism, access to and take up of very high capacity networks and promotion of competition in the provision of electronic communications networks and associated Rather than referring expressly to the expression "fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory", the Directive fleshes elements to access public sector information including reasonable remuneration, non-discriminatory access and transparency, which are central elements to FRAND-based regimes.
49
In detailing the conditions for access to public sector information, the Directive sets out the following FRAND-based elements:
• Public sector bodies may charge fees for supplying and allowing access to the information. The principles governing charging under Article 6 note that "charges shall be limited to the marginal costs incurred for their reproduction, provision and dissemination". 76 However, the marginal cost default does not apply where public sector bodies are required to generate revenue to cover a substantial part of their costs relating to the performance of their public tasks or, exceptionally, for documents for which the public sector body is required to generate sufficient revenue to cover a substantial part of the costs relating to their collection, production, reproduction and dissemination. Libraries, including university libraries, museums and archives are not bound by the marginal cost default, in order not to hinder their normal running.
77
• Article 6 also sets out how total charges shall be calculated "according to objective, transparent and verifiable criteria to be laid down by the Member States. The total income of those 74 EECC, Article 3. bodies from supplying and allowing re-use of documents over the appropriate accounting period shall not exceed the cost of collection, production, reproduction and dissemination [where relevant the preservation and rights clearance], together with a reasonable return on investment. Charges shall be calculated in line with the accounting principles applicable to the public sector bodies involved." Of note is Recital 23 that acknowledges that, when calculating a reasonable return on investment, libraries, museums and archives can consider the prices charged by the private sector for the re-use of identical or similar documents.
78
Given the specific context of public sector data, the Directive can provide guide points on what elements to consider in calculating fees (which is admittedly easier than calculating fees for e.g. private sector R&D intensive innovation).
• The requirement for non-discrimination is further specified in order to ensure free exchange of information between public sector bodies when exercising public tasks, "whilst other parties are charged for the re-use of the same documents", including differentiated charging policy for commercial and noncommercial re-use.
79
• The Directive requires that applicable conditions and the actual amount of those charges should be transparent (i.e. pre-established and public), including (on request) the calculation basis for charges and what factors should be taken into account in the calculation of charges for atypical cases. 80 This approach mirrors to some degree the behavioural aspect to FRAND licensing for SEPs set out in Huawei v ZTE and the European Commission's call for transparency and predictability in SEP licensing.
81
• Highlighting the importance of broad access, the Directive notes that where public sector bodies allow for re-use of documents, conditions should not unnecessarily restrict possibilities for reuse. In particular, conditions should not be used to restrict competition, 82 and must be nondiscriminatory for comparable categories of reuse (rather than users), notably where re-use also occurs by the commercial activities of public sector bodies.
83 Re-use is open to all potential actors and the Directive expressly prohibits the application of exclusive rights (except for the 86 It covers the rights of participants to the agreement ("beneficiaries" of funding) to have access under fair and reasonable conditions to each other's results (relevant background input held by participants prior to their accession to the project) that are needed for exploiting their own results.
87 Such access conditions apply where beneficiaries give each other access to the results needed for implementing their own tasks (or to other beneficiaries or affiliated entities). 88 In addition, there are options to require (when foreseen in the work programme) access to third parties for additional access rights for interoperability under fair and reasonable or royalty free conditions. 87 Ibid, Article 25 (access is restricted if the beneficiary holding the background has notified others prior to signing the Agreement that access to its background is subject to legal restrictions or limits).
88 Ibid, Article 31.
89 Ibid, Article 31.6. 1 52 Article 2(1)(10) of the Regulation defines "fair and reasonable conditions" to mean "appropriate conditions, including possible financial terms or royalty-free conditions, taking into account the specific circumstances of the request for access, for example the actual or potential value of the results or background to which access is requested and/or the scope, duration or other characteristics of the exploitation envisaged". 90 This definition applies to all the access situations described above.
91
53 It is notable that, no matter whether the access requirements relate to members of the consortium or their affiliates, whether for fulfilling their tasks, for exploiting their own efforts, or as relates to third parties (in relation to interoperability), the access regime remains the same. One can assume that "fair and reasonable" was considered by the legislature as flexible enough to deal with this broad range of interests and situations. For this reason, the definition implies that conditions can change depending on the circumstances of the request for access (i.e. the nature of the parties), as well as depending on the subjective nature of value or "other characteristics". Again, while not using the expression "FRAND", it can be assumed that the nondiscriminatory aspect is included, as the definition specifically allows for differentiation where such a differentiation can be made.
VI. Vehicle Emissions Regulation
54 European Regulation (EU) 715/2007, relating to emissions from light passenger and commercial vehicles and access to vehicle repair and maintenance information, contains a FRANDbased information sharing regime. It imposes specific obligations on vehicle manufacturers to enable access to vehicle repair and maintenance information both to authorised and independent dealers and repairers. 92 Such access is on a nondiscriminatory basis while permitting manufacturers to charge a "reasonable and proportionate fee".
93
However, the Regulation also notes that such fee is not reasonable or proportionate "if it discourages access by failing to take into account the extent to which the independent operator uses it", making it 90 Regulation 1290/2013, Article 2(1)(10).
91 Ibid, Article 25(3). Note that under Article 31, a distinction is drawn between royalty-bearing and royalty free, as these two options are given. However, logic would dictate that "fair and reasonable" includes royalty free in the range of royalties (as expressly noted in the definition of Article 25(3)) and because there are usually other material terms and conditions in licensing agreements that should also be fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory.
92 Vehicle Emission's Regulation, Article 7(1).
93 Ibid.
clear that the fee also needs to be in proportion to the importance of the information to the user as well as a reasonable value to the manufacturer.
94
55 Although not using the exact "FRAND" wording, the Vehicle Emissions Regulation very much mirrors the FRAND intention of ensuring that fees are reasonable and non-discriminatory, while at the same time not discouraging access.
VII. Directive on Payment Services
56 The revised Directive on Payment Services in the Internal Market 95 of 25 November 2015 sets out that account servicing payment service providers, such as banks, must allow third parties to obtain real-time data relating to customers' accounts on a non-discriminatory basis (including without any discrimination in terms of charges, timing and priority).
96 Colangelo and Borgogno query whether banks can charge a fee for the access to front-end third-party providers and speculate that such compulsory access can be compensated, "as it happens, mutatis mutandis, with standard essential patents that are licensed under fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory ("FRAND") terms". 97 We agree that such access would be on the basis of FRAND principles, in accordance with the recognised commercial practices in the payment services field (rather than SEPs, per se). One can presume that where European regulation requires access to data and interoperability, such access must be on FRAND terms. 
IX. EU Benchmarks Regulation
58 The pricing of many financial instruments and contracts rely on the accuracy of benchmarks. However, following the serious manipulation of LIBOR, EURIBOR and other benchmarks by various cartels 99 and the impact that the failure of critical benchmarks can have on market integrity, financial stability, consumers, the real economy, or the financing of households and businesses, the EU adopted the Benchmarks Regulation.
100 Specifically to mitigate the market power of critical benchmark administrators and bring discipline to the market, the Regulation contains a FRAND regime imposing, under Article 22, the obligation on administrators of critical benchmarks, including critical commodity benchmarks, 101 to take "adequate steps to ensure that licences of, and information relating to, the benchmark are provided to all users on a fair, reasonable, transparent and non-discriminatory basis". 102 This requirement is without prejudice to the application of EU competition law.
X. European Commission
Policy Discussions for FRAND Access to Data 59 The Commission is already considering the possibility of sharing the access to data between businesses, with FRAND access being one of the considered models. In 2017 the Commission published a Communication entitled "Building a European Data Economy". In relation to access to data, the Commission explored the idea of applying a FRAND regime, whereby access to machine generated data would be granted against remuneration. 103 The Communication notes that: "A framework potentially based on certain key principles, such as fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms, could be developed for data holders, such as manufacturers, service providers or other parties, to provide access to the data they hold against remuneration after anonymisation. Relevant legitimate interests, as well as the need to protect trade secrets, would need to be taken into account. The consideration of different access regimes for different sectors and/or business models could also be envisaged in order to take into account the specificities of each industry. For instance, in some cases, open access to data (full or partial) could be the preferred choice both for firms and for society." For example, para 1.9 states "In summary, our proposals required regulated benchmark administrators to grant access to and licences to use benchmarks on a fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory basis, including with regards to price. We proposed that such access should be provided within three months following a written request.
We proposed that different fees should be charged to different users only where this is objectively justified, having regard to reasonable commercial grounds such as the quantity, scope or field of use requested. Our proposals also set out a list of non-exhaustive factors that we may consider in assessing whether the terms of access to a benchmark are FRAND". 1 It recommended companies to consider voluntarily granting access to non-personal data to other businesses and, when doing so, to adhere to certain principles related to transparency, respect to each other's commercial interests, to ensure undistorted competition, and minimise lock-in.
107
The Commission at least appears to recognise that the problems raised by big data and dominant digital platforms could be resolved by some form of data sharing requirement on principles that mirror notions protected by the FRAND regime. the critical input is also varied. In some instances, the entities may possess or are likely to possess market power, in other instances the input is critical for market activity yet not necessarily critical to market access. In some instances, FRAND is applied in the context of disputes with particular steps in order to ensure access on reasonable terms. This shows the flexibility of the FRAND regime, which can apply to different players and in different circumstances.
F. The Nature of FRAND under European Law
63
The core elements of a FRAND regime can be summarised. At a high level, the purpose of the FRAND regime is to ensure broad and nondiscriminatory access to the relevant input. Where legal relations need to be regulated, such access will often be though a license or similar agreement, but where access is guaranteed, a separate agreement may not be required. Its aim is to ensure the widest possible market access and use of the input, while avoiding lock-in, hold up, or foreclosure.
64 From the regulatory FRAND examples highlighted above, the Standardisation Regulation and EECC expressly refer to the term "fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory" while leaving the details of the arrangement to the market. The other examples use access regimes that are essentially identical to FRAND in all but the express wording, creating FRAND-based conditions of balance, reasonableness, non-discrimination and transparency. In fact, it is arguable that the FRAND regime used by the European institutions is a general principle and that a FRAND policy need not reflect those exact words, in that exact order, in order to achieve the same result. It would be difficult to argue that those laws that do not use the exact expression "FRAND" somehow grant access on a significantly different basis.
65
The various examples of European regulation each provide, to some degree, greater guidance on the detail FRAND-like regimes, displaying significant consistency across the board. In particular:
• Fair & Reasonable balance: Legislation covering REACH, the European Vehicle Emissions Regulation, the Public Sector Information Directive and the Horizon 2020 Regulation, provide parameters and guide points on calculating payment ("compensation", "income", "charge", "financial terms"), emphasising the balance between costs/ investment over use/access and reflecting the different interests of the parties.
• Transparency: In addition, the Re-use of Public Sector Information Directive focuses on transparency of terms and conditions, including (on request) the calculation basis for the fee, mirroring Huawei v ZTE requirements for FRAND licensing of SEPs. In REACH and Huawei v ZTE, 1 definition of "fair and reasonable conditions", accepting that conditions could change depending on the position of the parties; i.e. the circumstances of the access request, the nature of value of the input, or other characteristics. Having said that, metrics do have an important role to play in terms of transparency purposes, when the parties are not able to reach a compromise or where terms need to be determined by a third party. Such a third party, whether a regulator, court, arbitrator or mediator, will need to be informed by valuation principles and modelling.
112
70 Assessing FRAND terms begins with an understanding of the nature of the input and relevant ecosystem. Some of the FRAND-based regulations are distinguished by the multiplicity of players involved in granting access to essential input that they control. One such example is REACH where we see common base formulae across product markets, applying per-tonnage fixed-fee price bands per substance.
113
Clearly each sector will have different considerations attached to them. FRAND metrics discussed for access to e.g. public data, publicly funded project results, standard essential technologies or access to API, are not interchangeable.
71 However, this paper shows that there are general principles that narrow down the discussion and concentrate the mind. Value considerations for access to dominant digital platform inputs are not impossible to explore. Looking at FRAND licensing commitments made by dominant platforms in merger cases, provides a useful insight into different means to assess FRAND.
72 For example, in Worldline/Equens, the remedies actually set out that the pricing of Poseidon licensing terms, which are structured around three main aspects, i.e. reference modules for which a price list is provided to NSPs to serve as a basis for bilateral negotiations; software maintenance fees, reference to a percentage of the license fee paid by NSPs (adjusted annually); and fees for ad hoc support services, set by reference to an hourly rate (adjusted annually). We therefore see that FRAND principles focus on providing transparent pricing, which can be the focus of negotiations and, where needed, adjudicated. Trustee is therefore a significant element, as is their need to have access to all of Worldline licenses in order to adjudicate on disputes. Nor does FRAND necessarily relate to the "price" of one input, but rather to all elements that are needed to ensure effective access, including maintenance, additional modules and upgrades. For this reason, the Worldline/ Equens remedies also included various flanking commitments.
114
73 In Newscorp/Telepiu, FRAND pricing for access to the API is to be determined by the lowest of the prices obtained when applying the two following principles: "(i) cost-oriented basis adopting where appropriate a long-run incremental costs approach and including a fair and reasonable contribution to the investment costs of set-top box roll-out and related infrastructure plus a reasonable return and (ii) relevant market values (where they exist) for comparable services." 115 It is notable that the Commission was willing to rely on two calculation methods: one economic model that factors both investment costs for implementation and return to the API holder; and one focusing on existing market comparables. However, rather than averaging out the rate, the policy choice was made to accept the lowest of the two. 116 But it is also true that, depending on the circumstances and nature of the parties, the financial terms may be only one consideration. A FRAND regime includes within its notion of fairness and reasonableness royalty-free and other nonmonetary considerations provided by the user for access, as well as important terms and conditions, which must be both fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory for access to the input.
